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Paying for Privacy: An Unjust Facade
Scott M. Ruggiero*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cell phones, pagers, and PDAs have tremendously improved worker
productivity in an era where time is money. Often, employers provide these
devices to employees free of charge. If a government employer provides one
of these devices to an employee, does the employer violate an employee's
Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable search and seizure when
the employer reads text messages sent and received by the employee using
the device? Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, an-
swered no, reversing the Ninth Circuit and affirming the district court's hold-
ing that the government's search was reasonable under the circumstances.'
The search was reasonable because: (1) it was motivated by the legitimate
work-related purpose of not wanting government employees to be forced to
pay for text message overages; and (2) the search was not excessive in scope
because it was an efficient way of determining whether the overages were
due to work-related or personal use.2 The Court applied valid law in reaching
its decision, but glossed over important facts that proved the search was ille-
gitimate and excessive in scope.3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Respondent Jeff Quon was a member of the Ontario, California Police
Department (OPD) SWAT Team.4 In 2001, the City of Ontario (City) ac-
quired twenty pagers with text-messaging capabilities. 5 As part of its service
contract with wireless-provider Arch Wireless Operating Company (Arch
Wireless), the City agreed to pay an additional fee for any excess messages
over the pagers' allotment.6 The City provided the pagers to SWAT "in order
to help the SWAT Team mobilize and respond to emergency situations."7
Prior to acquiring the pagers, the City instituted a "Computer Usage, Internet
and E-mail Policy" (Computer Policy).8 The policy applied to all City em-
ployees and provided that "[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using [City computer] resources" and that the City "re-
* Scott M. Ruggiero is a May 2012 Juris Doctorate candidate from Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. He is also a 2005 graduate of
Florida State University.
I. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010).
2. Id. at 2631.
3. See id. at 2626.
4. Id. at 2624.
5. Id. at 2625.
6. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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serve[d] the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail
and Internet use, with or without notice." 9 Quon acknowledged that he had
read and understood the Computer Policy by signing a statement.'0
Although the Computer Policy did not apply to the pagers per se, Lieu-
tenant Stephen Duke, who was in charge of procuring the contract with Arch
Wireless, told the officers at a staff meeting that the City considered the text
messages equivalent to e-mails, which were subject to auditing.], The of-
ficers received these comments in a memo from OPD Chief Lloyd Scharf on
April 29, 2002.12 Quon quickly exceeded his text message character allot-
ment, but Duke implied that Quon and other officers could avoid having
messages audited by directly reimbursing the City for overages.' 3 Quon
wrote a check to the City as reimbursement for the overages and subse-
quently wrote three to four additional checks to cover overages.' 4 Duke told
Scharf about the paid overages at a meeting in October 2002.15 As a result of
the meeting, Scharf decided he wanted to determine whether: (1) the existing
service plan with Arch Wireless provided insufficient character limits, forc-
ing his officers to pay for overages that were a result of work-related
messages; or (2) whether the overages were due to personal messages being
sent by the officers.16 Duke, at Scharf's request, contacted Arch Wireless and
requested Quon's message transcripts for August and September 2002.17
Scharf reviewed the transcripts with Quon's supervisor after Duke discov-
ered that many messages were not work-related, and some were sexually
explicit in nature.' 8 Scharf then referred the matter to OPD's internal affairs
division to determine "whether Quon was violating OPD rules by pursuing
personal matters while on duty."19 The internal affairs investigator redacted
all messages made by Quon while off duty by cross-referencing Quon's work
schedule.20 The internal affairs investigator discovered that "Quon sent or
received 456 messages" in the month of August, of which "no more than 57
9. Id.
10. Id.




15. Id. at 2626.
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were work related."21 Internal affairs found Quon had violated OPD rules,
and allegedly disciplined him. 22
III. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Quon filed suit against the City, the OPD, Scharf, and Arch Wireless in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California.23
Quon's ex-wife and mistress joined the suit, since both had exchanged
messages with Quon during August and September 2002.24 Quon brought
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,25 the Stored Communications Act (SCA),26
and California law.27 Quon's claims were predicated on the notion that: (1)
the petitioners violated Quon's Fourth Amendment right against an unreason-
able search and seizure; (2) the petitioners violated the SCA by reviewing the
message transcripts; and (3) Arch Wireless violated the SCA by providing
the transcripts to the petitioners. 28
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
All parties in the case filed cross-motions for summary judgment.29 The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch Wireless on the
SCA claim but denied the petitioners' summary judgment motion on Quon's
Fourth Amendment claims.30 The District Court found "Quon had a reasona-
21. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626 (noting that Quon sent up to 80 messages during a
single work day, and that he sent or received an average of 28 messages per
work day, with only 3 being work related).
22. Id. (the case does not indicate Quon's punishment).
23. Id.
24. id.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress").
26. See Unlawful Access to Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C § 2701
(2002) ("whoever intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided; or intention-
ally exceeds an authorization to access that facility thereby obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in such system shall be punished").
27. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1149
(C.D. Cal. 2006)).
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ble expectation of privacy in the content of his text messages."31 The District
Court left the jury to determine whether the purpose of the text-message au-
dit was to see whether Quon was using his pager to waste time and play
games, making for an unconstitutional search, or whether the purpose was for
the constitutionally permissible reason of verifying if the service plan was
insufficient in meeting the officers' needs by unfairly forcing them to pay for
work-related costs. 32 The jury found that the search was for the reasonable
purpose of verifying if the service plan was sufficient, so the District Court
held that the petitioners did not violate Quon's Fourth Amendment right.33
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.34 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling that Quon had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and the search was conducted as part of "a legitimate
work-related rationale."35 The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the search
"was not reasonable in scope" and was therefore unconstitutional because
there were multiple ways in which the petitioners could have avoided violat-
ing Quon's Fourth Amendment rights.36 For example, the petitioners could
have warned Quon that the contents of the messages would be reviewed or
asked Quon to redact the messages himself.37 Finally, the Ninth Circuit found
that Arch Wireless had violated the SCA and remanded to the District
Court.38
V. SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
The Supreme Court held that the City's review of the text messages was
reasonable and did not violate Quon's Fourth Amendment rights.39 The Court
agreed with both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit that the search was
primarily motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, which was to de-
termine whether the service plan allowed for a sufficient number of work-
related text messages to be sent and received without the officers having to
unfairly pay for overages, or, alternatively, whether the officers were sending
personal messages.40 The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and held
that the search was reasonable in scope "because it was an efficient and expe-
31. Id.
32. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
33. Id. at 2627.
34. Id. (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir.
2008)).
35. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d at 908.
36. Id. at 908-09.
37. Id. at 909.
38. Id. at 903.
39. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632.
40. Id. at 2631.
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dient way to determine whether Quon's overages were the result of work-
related messaging or personal use."'4 1 In reaching its decision, the Court ap-
plied the reasoning from O'Connor v. Ortega.42 The O'Connor plurality used
a different approach than Justice Scalia did in his concurrence. 43 But the
Court in City of Ontario v. Quon noted that the result would be the same
under either the O'Connor plurality approach or the approach promulgated
by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. 4 Even though the Court stated that the
result would be the same regardless of the approach, the Court focused its
analysis more on the O'Connor plurality approach since both the petitioners
and respondents agreed that the O'Connor plurality controlled.a5
V1. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Court began its analysis by clarifying the scope of the Fourth
Amendment as it is relevant to the case: "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer."46 Next, the Court noted that the probable cause require-
ment for the issuance of warrants was impracticable for government employ-
ers due to heightened requirements beyond that of law enforcement.47 The
Court pointed out that in the O'Connor decision there was a disagreement
about the proper framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment claims against
government employers.48 But the Court refused to acknowledge whether the
plurality approach or Justice Scalia's approach was better.49
The plurality approach in O'Connor consists of two steps.50 First, a
court must consider "the operational realities of the workplace" using a case-
by-case analysis, because the openness of some government offices lends no
reasonable expectation of privacy.51 In a later decision, Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court opined that an employee's privacy expecta-
tions could be diminished by "operational realities," and the "diminution
could be taken into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of a
workplace search."52 Second, "where an employee has a legitimate privacy
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
43. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726, 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628-629.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2628 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628-29.
50. Id. (citing O'Connor, 490 U.S. at 726).
51. Id. (citing O'Connor, 490 U.S. at 726).
52. Id. (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989)).
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expectation, an employer's intrusion on that expectation" for investigations
regarding work-related misconduct or non-investigatory work-related pur-
poses should be governed by a reasonableness standard.53 The search is rea-
sonable if it is "justified at its inception" and "the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intru-
sive in light of 'the circumstances."54
Contrary to the plurality view in O'Connor, Justice Scalia's concurring
approach disregards the "operational realities" and instead concludes that the
offices of government employees are "covered by Fourth Amendment pro-
tections as a general matter."55 Justice Scalia believed that if the govern-
ment's searches were to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate
workplace violations, similar to the sort of searches that are considered rea-
sonable in the private-employer context, then there would be no violation of
the Fourth Amendment.56
The Court assumed three propositions arguendo before it analyzed the
case under the plurality approach and Justice Scalia's approach: (1) Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy; (2) the petitioners' review of the
message transcripts qualified as a search under the Fourth Amendment; and
(3) a government-employer's search of an employee's electronic records is
equivalent to the search of a physical office.57 The Court stated that "the
search was justified at its inception because there were 'reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for a non-investigatory work-
related purpose.'"58 The Court pointed out that a jury determined that the
search was instigated by Scharf for the legitimate work-related purpose of
ensuring that the limits of the service contract with Arch Wireless were suffi-
cient to meet the OPD's needs, that his employees were not unfairly paying
for work-related expenses, or in the alternative, that the City was not paying
for his employees' personal communications.59
The Court next looked at the scope of the search and determined that it
was reasonable. 60 The Court stated that reviewing the transcripts was both
efficient and expedient in determining whether the messages were work or
personal-related.6 The Court particularly focused on the fact that the review
53. Id. at 2628 (citing O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26).
54. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26).
55. Id. at 2628 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J. concurring)).
56. Id. (citing O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J. concurring)).
57. Id. at 2630.
58. Id. at 2631 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726).
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of the transcripts was not "excessively intrusive" because there were a num-
ber of ways the City could have done an even more intrusive search.62
First, the City's search could have been more intrusive, but the City
reviewed only two months of transcripts, rather than reviewing every month
Quon had exceeded his allotment.63 Second, the Supreme Court stated that
the City's search was less intrusive than a search of Quon's personal e-mail
or a wiretap on his home phone.64 The Court also pointed out that the inter-
nal-affairs investigator attempted to protect Quon's privacy by redacting all
of the text messages that Quon sent while he was off-duty.65 The Court then
noted that Quon, a police officer, could reasonably assume his messages
were subject to auditing since "sound management principles might require
the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropri-
ately used."66
In addition, the Count again pointed out that Quon had been told his
messages were subject to being audited.67 The Supreme Court stated that the
Ninth Circuit's approach, that there were other less intrusive means of pro-
viding the search, was inconsistent with controlling precedents because
courts have refused to state that only the "least intrusive" search was permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment.68 Finally, the Court addressed Justice
Scalia's approach by stating that the City's legitimate reasons for the
search-coupled with the fact that the search was not excessively intrusive-
would be "regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer
context."69
VII. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
There are three problems with the Supreme Court's approach in this
case: (1) the Court only reluctantly considered the "privacy expectations in
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government em-
62. Id. (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726).
63. Id.




68. Id. at 2632 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. at 663 (1995));
see also, e.g., Board of Ed. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647
(1983).
69. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J.
concurring)).
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ployer;"70 (2) the Court glossed over facts marring its decision; and (3) the
Court continued to rely on both the O'Connor plurality and Scalia
approaches.
First, the Supreme Court refused to seriously consider Quon's privacy
expectations. Specifically, the Court stated that it would assume arguendo
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages. 71
This reluctance is not surprising considering the facts that the Court laid out
earlier in the decision. For example, the Court stated that Duke told Quon
about his first overage and then implied he could avoid having his messages
audited by paying out-of-pocket for any overages. 72 It is reasonable to as-
sume that Quon would have had more than a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy; rather, he probably felt that he had an absolute expectation of privacy
since he was paying for overages. While the Court focused on the purported
legitimate work-related interests that Scharf stated he was concerned about, it
pushed aside Quon's expectation of privacy,
Second, the Court glossed over facts in the case. The Court repeatedly
noted that Scharf was concerned about his employees having to pay fees for
sending work-related messages. 7 3 Interestingly, the opinion is devoid of any
mention of whether there was any policy or other memorandum that stated
that employees were required to pay for text message overages out of their
own pocket. This supposed legitimate work-related consideration was not
supported by the facts of the case and should not have been taken into ac-
count by the Court. The Court simply "assumes" facts in favor of the govern-
ment which "makes reasonable almost any workplace search by a public
employer."74
Finally, the Court erred in relying on the O'Connor approaches: that of
the plurality and Justice Scalia's approach in the concurrence. As the Ninth
Circuit correctly pointed out, there were less-intrusive alternatives that the
City could have employed to make the search more reasonable in scope. 75
The Ninth Circuit never stated that the least intrusive measure would be
needed in order to avoid interfering with the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit opined that lesser alternatives were available. This Court's mis-
guided belief that the search would be acceptable for work-related miscon-
duct or non-investigatory, work-related purposes is "illusory."76 This broad
70. Id. at 2629 (further showing its reluctance by stating that "the judiciary risks
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerg-
ing technology before its role in society has become clear").
71. Id. at 2630.
72. Id. at 2625.
73. Id. at 2625-26.
74. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632.
76. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 746 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and very low threshold makes it "difficult to imagine a search that would not
fit into one or the other of the categories."77 Accordingly, the government
need only recite the magic words that the search was "work-related" in order
to overcome Fourth Amendment concerns. The government must realize that
employee misconduct that merely "disrupts the workplace but does not break
the law" should be handled differently than misconduct that has criminal
implications.78
VIII. CONCLUSION
This case presents several long-term issues. Most notably, in today's era
of BlackBerrys and other smart phones provided by employers, what happens
when an employer pays for only a portion of the device, while the device is
used for both personal and work-related matters? Under these facts, will gov-
ernment-employer searches continue to be found reasonable?
[W]henever, as here, courts fail to concentrate on the facts of
a case ... predilections inevitably surface, no longer held in check
by the 'discipline' of the facts, and shape, more than they ever
should and even to an extent unknown to the judges themselves,
any legal standard that is then articulated.79
Even though the government has an inescapable role as a "purveyor of
morality," this Court has shown that it protects the government rather than
the individual.80 Only time will tell if the Court will address the reasonable-
ness threshold.
77. Id.
78. Michelle Hess, What's Left of the Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Is the
Standard of Reasonable Suspicion Sufficiently Protecting Your Rights?, 15
FED. CIR. B.J. 255, 277 (2005).
79. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 734 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Jar Wars: Employee Drug Testing, The Constitution, and
the American Drug Problem, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 385 (1988).
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